Analysis

Riot’s franchising and tournament-organizer access

The closed-league franchising model — pioneered by Riot Games in the LCS and LEC, mirrored by Activision in Overwatch League, partially adopted by Valve…

The closed-league franchising model — pioneered by Riot Games in the LCS and LEC, mirrored by Activision in Overwatch League, partially adopted by Valve in Counter-Strike — is the esports industry's most consequential governance choice. It is also its most legally exposed.

The structural argument is that a single publisher controls both the underlying intellectual property and the premium competitive ecosystem built on it. That vertical alignment has produced operational benefits — predictable seasons, predictable revenue, professionalised teams. It has also produced a population of foreclosed tournament organisers who, in a more open ecosystem, would compete to host top-tier events. Two of those organisers have, in the past eighteen months, filed Article 101/102 complaints with the European Commission.

The Commission has not opened a formal investigation. It is, however, asking the questions: is the franchising fee an objective licensing structure or an exclusionary toll? Are the third-party tournament restrictions necessary to protect competitive integrity or wider than necessary? Is access to the underlying game IP available on FRAND-equivalent terms?

The CJEU's Superleague analysis is directly applicable: a private league that controls market access must do so under criteria that are transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Riot's franchising rules clear two of those four. Whether they clear the other two is, for now, a question with no published answer.

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